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Successful mindreading entails both the ability to think about what others know or believe,
and to use this knowledge to generate predictions about how mental states will inﬂuence
behavior. While previous studies have demonstrated that young infants are sensitive to
others’ mental states, there continues to be much debate concerning how to characterize
early theory of mind abilities. In the current study, we asked whether 6-month-old infants
appreciate the causal role that beliefs play in action. Speciﬁcally, we tested whether infants
generate action predictions that are appropriate given an agent’s current belief. We
exploited a novel, neural indication of action prediction: motor cortex activation as mea-
sured by sensorimotor alpha suppression, to ask whether infants would generate differen-
tial predictions depending on an agent’s belief. After ﬁrst verifying our paradigm and
measure with a group of adult participants, we found that when an agent had a false belief
that a ball was in the box, motor activity indicated that infants predicted she would reach
for the box, but when the agent had a false belief that a ball was not in the box, infants did
not predict that she would act. In both cases, infants based their predictions on what the
agent, rather than the infant, believed to be the case, suggesting that by 6 months of age,
infants can exploit their sensitivity to other minds for action prediction.
 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Accurately predicting what others will do is mediated
by our understanding that their actions are driven, not nec-
essarily by what we think or know to be the case, but by
what they think and believe. Despite being fundamental
for successful social interaction, the ability to generate ac-
tion predictions on the basis of others’ perspectives has
long been thought to be a protracted developmental
achievement (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Successful
action prediction will often require at least three different
stages of computation. First, one needs to understand that
others’ actions are goal-directed and identify what goal ismotivating their behavior (e.g. she wants to get the ball).
They then need to consider what that person knows or be-
lieves about their goal (e.g. she thinks her ball is in the cup-
board). Finally, they need to use their representations of
the other’s goals and beliefs to generate a prediction about
how these elements will inﬂuence her subsequent behav-
ior (Dennett, 1989) (e.g. she will search for her ball in the
cupboard).
In recent years, this view of theory of mind acquisition
as progressing through stages over the ﬁrst few years of life
has been challenged by the discovery that, even in the ﬁrst
year after birth, infants not only readily interpret others’
actions as goal-directed (Gergely, Nadasdy, Csibra, & Biro,
1995; Woodward, 1998), but appear to appreciate that
goal-directed behavior is modulated by an agent’s belief
(Luo, 2011). When presented with scenarios in which an
agent acts either consistently or inconsistently with how
their past experience should lead them to act, preverbal
infants respond with increased attention to the inconsis-
tently-behaving agent (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Surian,
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as 7 months appear to spontaneously encode events from
other’s perspectives, reacting with increased interest when
a ball which an agent should believe to be present is re-
vealed to be absent (Kovacs, Teglas, & Endress, 2010).
These studies suggest that infants are sensitive to oth-
ers’ perspectives and resulting beliefs (Rakoczy, 2012).
However, there is much debate concerning to what extent
this demonstrated sensitivity to others’ beliefs should be
interpreted as a genuine understanding of belief. Recent
theoretical papers have highlighted the various ways in
which the underlying cognitive states that drive infant’s
behavior on non-verbal false belief tasks might fall short
of a true understanding of belief (Apperly & Butterﬁll,
2011; Rakoczy, 2012). For example, Rakoczy (2012) dis-
cusses the possibility that infants may be relying on sub-
doxastic states rather than propositional attitudes when
reacting to the outcomes of events in looking-time para-
digms. One essential difference is whether or not such
mental states can be inferentially integrated. According
to Rakoczy, a true understanding of belief requires that
one appreciate that a belief is related to other mental
states (e.g. goals), and to outputs (e.g. actions). It is the
integration of different states (e.g. goals and beliefs) and
an appreciation of the consequences of these states for ac-
tion, that is central to Dennett’s so-called ‘Intentional
Stance’ which he proposes we adopt when explaining
and predicting the behavior of others (Dennett, 1989).
However, while an appreciation of the relationship be-
tween beliefs and other mental states, or beliefs and action,
seems central to the concept of belief, we do not know
whether young infants have an appreciation of these rela-
tionships. For example, in Kovacs and colleagues study, be-
lief sensitivity manifested as interference: infants own
representation of the location of a hidden object seemed
to be inﬂuenced by what they knew of the others’ repre-
sentation of the object (Kovacs et al., 2010). While studies
with young infants clearly provide evidence that infants
are sensitive to others’ mental states (Rakoczy, 2012), they
do not provide evidence that infants understand, for exam-
ple, that beliefs play a causal role in action because they do
not show that infants expect that a particular belief will lead
to a particular action outcome. This is, in part, because look-
ing-time provides only an indication that infants are sensi-
tive to some event, and cannot provide evidence that
infants expected that a particular outcomewould result from
that event (Haith, 1998; Wellman, 2011). There is much con-
tradictory evidence concerning the extent to which infants
might understand the relationship between mental states
and subsequent behavior. For example, some have suggested
that infants’ early sensitivity to others’ goals does not sup-
port a prediction concerning how these goals will inﬂuence
action (Daum, Attig, Gunawan, Prinz, & Gredebäck, 2012),
whereas other evidence suggests that infants can generate
predictions concerning what others will do given a particular
goal, at around the same time as they demonstrate this
understanding in their looking-time response (Southgate &
Begus, 2013; Southgate, Johnson, El Karoui, & Csibra, 2010).
In the current study, we sought evidence that, at around
the same age as infants demonstrate a sensitivity to others’
beliefs (Kovacs et al., 2010), they also appreciate the causalrole that beliefs play in action. Speciﬁcally, we asked
whether 6-month-old infants generate action predictions
that are appropriate given a false belief held by an agent.
Two approaches to measuring action predictions in prever-
bal infants have been used in recent years. Firstly, eye
tracking has revealed that infants make saccades towards
the end point of an ongoing event, suggesting that they
are able to generate predictions concerning how the event
will culminate. For example, when infants see a hand
reaching towards a previously chosen and unchosen ob-
ject, they make anticipatory saccades in the direction of
the previously chosen object, presumably because they
predict that the hand will again approach the same object
(Cannon & Woodward, 2012). While eye tracking is an ex-
tremely useful measure of action prediction, it may also
have its limitations. For example, in order to demonstrate
their ability to generate action predictions, infants need
to disengage from a moving stimuli (e.g. a hand) and move
their eyes towards a static one (e.g. an object that the hand
is approaching). This ability to visually disengage from an
interesting stimulus, thought to reﬂect endogenous atten-
tion control, continues to improve across the ﬁrst year of
life, with infants at 7 months being slower to disengage
than infants at 14 months (Elsabbagh et al., 2013). Thus,
while an absence of anticipatory saccades is commonly
interpreted as an inability to generate predictions (Cannon
& Woodward, 2012; Falck-Ytter, Gredeback, & Hofsten,
2006; Kanakogi & Itakura, 2011), it might also reﬂect in-
fant’s immature visual disengagement. An alternative ap-
proach to measuring action prediction in infancy thus
relies not on eye movements, but on a likely neural corre-
late of action prediction, motor cortex activation. It is well
known that areas of an observer’s motor system are re-
cruited when generating predictions about others’ actions
(Cross, Stadler, Parkinson, Schütz-Bosbach, & Prinz, 2011;
Kilner, Vargas, Duval, Blakemore, & Sirigu, 2004; Schubotz,
2007; Stadler et al., 2012), and this phenomenon has also
been demonstrated in infants (Southgate & Begus, 2013;
Southgate, Johnson, Osborne, & Csibra, 2009; Southgate
et al., 2010;). One measure of motor activation is a de-
crease in the resting-state alpha rhythm, recordable on
the EEG, over sensorimotor cortex (Marshall & Meltzoff,
2011). For example, 9-month-old infants exhibit a signiﬁ-
cant decrease in alpha amplitude over sensorimotor cortex
(implying motor activation) when they are presented with
an image of an object that experience has taught them im-
plies an impending action (Southgate & Begus, 2013), dem-
onstrating that motor cortex activation can serve as a
useful correlate of action prediction in infants. That motor
cortex activation may be a more sensitive measure of in-
fants abilities to generate action predictions is suggested
by the fact that, despite not generating anticipatory eye
movements towards the target object of a mechanical claw
(Cannon & Woodward, 2012), even younger infants never-
theless exhibit motor activation when they observe a claw
in the presence of an object that it had previously ap-
proached (but not when the claw is in the presence of an
object that it had previously ignored)(Southgate & Begus,
2013).
Here, we measured motor activation to investigate
whether infants would appropriately predict when
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that they falsely believe either does, or does not, contain a
desired object. Rather than asking where someone with a
false belief will search as is typical with older children
(Wimmer & Perner, 1983), measuring motor activation al-
lows us to ask simply whether infants expect that the
agent will act at all. To this end, we designed two false be-
lief scenarios that generated different action predictions. In
one case, an agent falsely believes a ball to be in a box in
front of her (she was absent when the ball rolled away)
and so, if infants understand that she has a false belief
about the situation, and the consequences of this false be-
lief for her subsequent action, they should predict that she
will reach for the box. In the second case, the same agent
falsely believes that the ball is not in the box (she was ab-
sent when the ball returned). If the infant understands that
she has a false belief, and the consequences of this belief
for her action, they should not expect that she will reach
for the box. These two conditions make opposing predic-
tions about activity in the motor system. In the case where
the agent falsely believes the ball to be present (herein
called the A+O condition, where the agent believes the
ball to be present but the observer knows the ball to be ab-
sent), an expectation of action should lead to an increase in
motor activation, as measured by a decrease in sensorimo-
tor alpha suppression. In the case where the agent falsely
believes the ball to be absent (herein called the AO+ con-
dition, where the agent believes the ball to be absent but
the observer knows the ball to be present), no expectation
of action should result in no increase in motor activation
and no decrease in sensorimotor alpha suppression.
In Experiment 1, we ﬁrst veriﬁed our measure and de-
sign with a group of adult participants. In Experiment 2,
we tested a group of 6-month-old infants.2. Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we tested a group of adult participants
in order to conﬁrm that our neural measure of action pre-
diction yielded the expected results. Adults were presented
with two kinds of false belief trials in which either the
agent had a false belief that a desired ball was inside a
box in front of her, or she had a false belief that the ball
was not inside the box. Although her belief was false in
both cases (since the observing adult knew that the ball
was actually not inside the box, or was inside the box,
respectively), the observer’s expectation that the agent
would act should differ depending on the agent’s belief.
In the case where the agent falsely believes the ball to be
in the box (A+O), the observer should expect that she
would reach for the box to obtain the ball. As action predic-
tions are accompanied by motor activation, we expected to
see evidence of motor activation on A+O trials. However,
in the case where the agent has a false belief that the ball is
not in the box (AO+), the observer should not expect her
to act towards the box and we should not see evidence of
motor activation in the observer. Such differential motor
activation would indicate that the observer is indeed inter-
preting the events as intended and appreciates the conse-
quences of false beliefs for subsequent actions. Thesecond aim of testing adults was to simultaneously obtain
eye-tracking data to provide support for our use of motor
activation as a measure of action prediction. In previous
studies, it has been shown that motor activation accompa-
nies action predictions, and is absent when an action is not
expected, in both adults (Kilner et al., 2004) and infants
(Southgate & Begus, 2013). Here we hypothesize that par-
ticipants will exhibit motor activation when they predict
that the agent will reach for the box. If observers are in-
deed expecting the agent to reach for the box, they might
be expected to focus more on the agent’s hand when they
expect her to reach than when they do not expect her to
reach. Thus, we analyzed not only whether observer’s
exhibited more motor activation on A+O trials than
AO+ trials, but also whether they generated more eye-
movements towards the agent’s hand on A+O trials than
on AO+ trials.
2.1. Methods
2.1.1. Participants
11 undergraduate students contributed to the ﬁnal
sample of data. A further 16 participants were tested but
excluded from the ﬁnal sample. Primarily, despite instruct-
ing participants to avoid blinking, the long length of trials
made this difﬁcult and 14 participants blinked during the
anticipation period of most trials and so, as with previous
studies investigating motor activation in adults (Babiloni
et al., 2009; Streltsova, Berchio, Gallese, & Umilta, 2010),
their data was excluded. The data of 2 additional adults
was excluded because of excessive noise (1) and technical
problems (1). Participants received course credit or mone-
tary compensation for participation.
2.1.2. Stimuli
Stimuli consisted of two types of 14 s trials. The two
types of test trial began with the ball either rolling towards
and jumping into the box from the right-hand side of the
screen (A+O trials) or jumping out of the box and rolling
away to the right-hand side of the screen (AO+ trials).
After this initial event, a curtain came down to hide the
agent. At this point, the box opened again and the ball
either jumped out of the box and rolled away (A+O trials)
or rolled towards and jumped into the box (AO+ trials). In
both trial types, the lid then closed and the curtain was
raised to reveal the actress stationary and looking down-
ward at the closed box (see Fig. 2 for the same sequence
of events in the format presented to infants. The image in
Fig. 1 depicts the slightly different arrangement presented
to adults). The actress then behaved consistently with her
false belief. In A+O trials, she remained stationary for
1500 ms before reaching towards and grasping the lid of
the box (1500 ms). In AO+ trials, she remained stationary
for 3000 ms to equate the length of the two trials. Test tri-
als were presented in a pseudo-randomized order and
were presented on a 58  102 cm screen. To keep the adult
and infant version comparable, participants were pre-
sented with no more than 20 repetitions of each trial type.
After artefact rejection, included adults contributed be-
tween 8 and 13 (median = 10) A+O trials, and between
6 and 13 (median = 9) AO+ trials. There was no signiﬁcant
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Fig. 1. Adult participant results. (a) EEG data: time–frequency (TF) plots for the 2 types of test trial. TF plots reﬂect baseline corrected activity averaged over
the four left sensorimotor channels, and over all participants. Zero is the onset of the agent reappearance and activity averaged over the ﬁrst 500 ms of this
period was compared to the baseline period. Black rectangles indicate the time and frequency range over which statistics were computed. (b) Eye-tracking
data: upper graph shows the proportion of valid trials on which the participant’s ﬁrst anticipation was directed towards the agent’s hand on the two types
of false belief trial, and lower graph shows the mean duration of participant’s looking to the agent’s hand on the two types of false belief trial.
Fig. 2. The two types of false belief test trial presented to infants. Each began with either the ball jumping into the box (A+O) or jumping out of the box
(AO+). The actress then disappeared behind a curtain and infant watched as the ball then jumped out of the box (A+O), or jumped back in (AO+). The
curtain then rose to reveal the actress, stationary, looking down at the box. Changes in sensorimotor alpha were measured during this stationary
reappearance period.
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two trial types (p > .4).
2.1.3. Procedure
2.1.3.1. EEG. EEG was recorded continuously using a 128-
electrode Hydrocel Geodesic Sensor Net (Electrical Geode-
sic, Eugene, USA), sampled at 250 Hz, recorded with re-
spect to the vertex electrode and re-referenced to the
average prior to analysis. Following recording, EEG was
segmented into 5500 ms segments (beginning 3500 ms be-
fore, and ending 2000 ms after, the point at which theagent reappeared) and time–frequency analyses were per-
formed on each artefact-free segment by continuous wave-
let transform using Morelet wavelets at 1 Hz intervals in
the 6–30 Hz range. To eliminate distortion created by the
wavelet transform, the ﬁrst and last 500 ms of each seg-
ment was removed. A 400 ms period, beginning 1000 ms
before the reappearance of the actress, was selected as a
baseline. This time windowwas chosen as the event occur-
ring within it, the onset of the curtain raising to reveal the
actress, was the same in both test trial types. Averaged
activity in the baseline period was subtracted from the ﬁrst
1 This was either because the eye tracker lost the participant’s eyes
during the anticipatory period or because the participant did not shift their
eyes from the agent’s face.
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the agent was stationary. Average wavelet coefﬁcients
within participants were calculated by taking the mean
across trials. Based on previous research indicating the
presence of motor activation in the beta band (13–30 Hz)
in adults (Caetano, Jousmäki, & Hari, 2007; Kilner,
Marchant, & Frith, 2009), we analyzed activity across this
entire frequency range. Unlike for infants, we had no
strong prediction concerning whether motor activation
should be lateralized and so we analyzed activity at both
left and right sensorimotor electrodes (left: 30, 36, 37,
42; right: 87, 93, 104, 105).
2.1.3.2. Eye tracking. Throughout EEG data acquisition, eye-
tracking data was also obtained. A Tobii (Stockholm, Swe-
den) TX300 Eye Tracker was used in standalone mode and
with a sampling rate of 300 Hz. Eye-tracking data was col-
lected and synchronized with EEG data via custom-built
Matlab scripts, employing the T2T package (http://
psy.ck.sissa.it/t2t/About_T2T.html). Prior to the beginning
of the experiment, a 5-point calibration was carried out.
2.2. Results
2.2.1. EEG
Average activity in the 13–30 Hz range was compared
in a 2  2  2 ANOVA with Time (Baseline vs. agent reap-
pearance), Trial type (A+O vs. AO+), and Location (Left
vs. Right electrodes) as within-subjects factors. This analy-
sis revealed a signiﬁcant interaction between Time and
Trial type [F(1,10) = 13.69, p = .004, g2p = .578] and a main
effect of Location that approached signiﬁcance
[F(10) = 3.56, p = .08, g2p = .263]. Consequently, we decided
to analyze amplitude at each location separately. A 2
(Time)  2 (Trial type) ANOVA on left hemisphere channels
revealed a signiﬁcant interaction between factors. Follow-
up paired-samples t-tests on each Trial Type separately
showed that there was a signiﬁcant decrease in amplitude
from baseline to the agent reappearance for A+O trials
[t(10) = 2.82, p = .02] but no decrease from baseline to
agent reappearance for AO+ trials [t(10) = 1.25,
p = .24]. The same ANOVA on right hemisphere channels
did not reveal any signiﬁcant effects [p’s > .1]. This result
implies that adults recruited their motor cortex on A+O
trials, when the agent with the false belief that the object
is present should be expected to reach for the box, but
not on the AO+ trials, when the agent with the false belief
that the object is absent should not be expected to reach
for the box. As with previous research in infants, this effect
was restricted to left sensorimotor cortex. The presence of
motor activation when the agent had a false belief about
the ball’s presence, but not when she had a false belief
about the ball’s absence, suggests that participants made
a different prediction about what she would do in each
case. Speciﬁcally, the presence of motor activation, which
has previously been demonstrated when adults and infants
expect someone else to act (Caetano et al., 2007; Kilner
et al., 2004; Southgate & Begus, 2013), in the A+O condi-
tion, suggests that participants expected the agent to reach
for the box and based their action prediction on what the
agent, rather than the infant, believed to be the case.2.2.2. Eye tracking
To add support to our interpretation that motor activa-
tion reﬂects a prediction that the agent will act in the
A+O condition, but that she will not act in the AO+ con-
dition, we analyzed participant’s eye-movements during
this anticipation period, reasoning that if they were indeed
predicting an action in one condition but not the other,
that they may also generate overt ﬁxations towards the
hand in the A+O condition but not in the AO+ condition.
Visual inspection suggested that participants ﬁxated 3 re-
gions during the anticipatory period: they remained ﬁx-
ated on the agent’s face, they shifted their gaze to the
agent’s hand, or they shifted their gaze to the box in front
of the agent. Participants were equally likely to shift their
gaze from the agent’s face on both A+O and the AO+ tri-
als (median = 8 trials for A+O and 9 trials for AO+ trials,
a difference that is not signiﬁcant, p = .4). Thus, we asked
whether, out of those trials on which participants did shift
their gaze during the anticipatory period (valid trials),
whether they were more likely to shift their gaze to the
hand on A+O trials than on AO+ trials. To address this
question, we took two measures. First, we asked whether
participants were more likely to make a ﬁrst look to the
hand on A+O trials than on AO+ trials. To account for
the fact that participants did not make an anticipatory look
on every trial,1 we divided the number of trials on which
participants made a ﬁrst look to the hand by the total num-
ber of valid trials (47 % of all presented trials). This analysis
showed that participants made signiﬁcantly more ﬁrst looks
to the hand on A+O trials than on AO+ trials [59% of all
ﬁrst looks were to the hand on A+O trials, compared to
only 27% on AO+ trials, t = (10) = 2.74, p = .02], a ﬁnding
that was also conﬁrmed with non-parametric statistics
[Z = 2.1004, p = .04, two-tailed]. For our second measure,
we asked whether participants spent longer ﬁxating the
hand in the A+O condition than in the AO+ condition.
To do this, we calculated the total duration of ﬁxations to-
wards the hand on each trial and again divided this number
by the number of trials contributing this data. This analysis
revealed that participants spent longer ﬁxating the hand in
the A+O condition than in the AO+ condition [t(10) =
2.53, p = .03], a result again conﬁrmed with non-parametric
statistics [Z = 2.31, p = .02, two-tailed]. Together, these
analyses demonstrate that on trials in which participants
should expect the agent to act if they have taken into ac-
count her false belief (the A+O trials), they are more likely
to ﬁxate on her hand ﬁrst, and spend more time ﬁxating on
her hand, than on trials in which they should not expect her
to act (AO+ trials). Together with previous research which
has implicated the motor system in action prediction
(Caetano et al., 2007; Kilner et al., 2004; Schubotz, 2007;
Southgate & Begus, 2013; Southgate et al., 2009), the
tendency to ﬁxate the agent’s hand during the anticipation
period on A+O trials, when participants also exhibit a signif-
icant increase in motor activation, supports our interpretation
that the motor activation we see on these trials does reﬂect
the participant’s prediction that the agent will act.
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In Experiment 2, we used our EEG measure to ask
whether 6-month-olds predict others’ actions in accord
with their belief states. Previous research has shown that
infants of around the same age are indeed sensitive to oth-
ers’ beliefs (Kovacs et al., 2010), but it is unknown whether
infants of this age have any appreciation of the functional
consequences of those beliefs. The experiment was identi-
cal to that run with adults with 2 exceptions. First, infants
were given 4 familiarization trials to familiarize them with
the agent’s goal (to obtain the ball) and the 2 different out-
comes (agent reaches, agent does not reach). Furthermore,
since we only measured EEG with infants,2 we reduced the
likelihood of infants making large horizontal eye movements
during the anticipatory period by positioning the box di-
rectly in front of the agent and her hand behind the box
(see Fig. 2).
3.1. Methods
3.1.1. Participants
13. full-term 6-month-olds participated in the study
(mean age 185 days; range 173–204 days). To be included
in the analysis, infants were required to provide at least 6
artefact- and movement-free trials for each of the two test
trial types. An additional 21 infants were excluded from
the analysis because they contributed too few artefact-
and movement-free trials (17), had extreme amplitude val-
ues (z > 2.5) (1), or because of experimenter and/or equip-
ment error (3). The ﬁnal number of infants included and
the exclusion rate is typical of EEG studies with infants
(Marshall, Young, & Meltzoff, 2010; Saby, Marshall, &
Meltzoff, 2012; Southgate, Csibra, Kaufman, & Johnson,
2008; Stapel, Hunnius, van Elk, & Bekkering, 2010).
3.1.2. Stimuli
Stimuli consisted of four 7 s familiarization trials and
the same two types of 14 s test trials that were presented
to adults. Familiarization trials were included to familiar-
ize infants with the agent’s goal and with both the reach
and no reach outcomes, and the outcomes (reach or no
reach) were always consistent with the agent’s experience
(i.e. she reached when the ball had jumped into the box but
she did not reach when the ball had jumped out of the box
and left the scene). Both familiarization trials began with
an actress seated in front of a small box, the lid of which
then opened. In the ﬁrst familiarization, a blue ball rolled
from the right-hand side of the screen and jumped into
the box, after which the lid closed and the actress reached
towards the box. In the second familiarization, the same
ball jumped out of the box, rolled away to the right of
the screen, after which the lid closed and the actress re-
mained looking at the box but without reaching.
With the exception that, for infants, the box was placed
directly in front of the agent, the two types of test trial
(Fig. 2) were identical to those presented to adult partici-2 Piloting indicated that the time spent at the beginning of the study
calibrating the eye-tracker reduced the number of trials the infant was
likely to tolerate and thus the quality of the EEG data.pants. Test trials were presented in a pseudo-randomized
order with the stipulation that within every 10 trials, 5
repetitions of each test trial type should be presented to
ensure that we could collect enough data given the limited
amount of trials infants were likely to tolerate.
3.1.3. Procedure
Four familiarization trials (2 of each kind) were fol-
lowed by repeated presentations of the two types of test
trial until infants became inattentive. The procedure for
EEG was the same as described for adults. Unlike for adults,
the frequency band that appears to be most reactive during
action execution in infants is the alpha band (Southgate &
Begus, 2013; Southgate et al., 2009; Southgate et al., 2010).
In previous studies with 9-month-old infants, we obtained
reaches from infants and identiﬁed their individual fre-
quency range (Southgate & Begus, 2013; Southgate et al.,
2009; Southgate et al., 2010). However, obtaining clear
reaches from 6-month-old infants was often difﬁcult,3
and so rather than select the alpha frequency band to be
analyzed on the basis of participant’s own reaching, we
averaged all infant’s data over the 5–7 Hz frequency band,
which encompasses the alpha frequency band in infants of
this age (Berchicci et al., 2011; Marshall, Bar-Haim, & Fox,
2002). Thus, 5–7 Hz averaged activity in the baseline period
was subtracted from the ﬁrst 500 ms following the actress’
reappearance, during which the actress was stationary.
Average wavelet coefﬁcients within infants were calculated
by taking the mean across trials. Based on previous work
showing that, in infants, motor activation during action
prediction is restricted to the left sensorimotor cortex
(Southgate & Begus, 2013; Southgate et al., 2009; Southgate
et al., 2010), we analyzed activity over the cluster of 4 left
sensorimotor channels (electrode numbers 30, 36, 37 and
42). As in infants we expect to ﬁnd evidence of motor activa-
tion within the alpha frequency, we additionally analyzed
changes within the alpha band at 4 occipital channels (elec-
trode numbers 70, 71, 76 and 83, approximating O1 and O2
on the 10–10 layout) in order to ensure that any central al-
pha changes are not confused with occipital alpha changes.
Reported analyses reﬂect data averaged over each cluster
of 4 electrodes.
3.2. Results
Average amplitude in the 5–7 Hz frequency range was
compared in a 2  2 ANOVA with Time (Baseline vs. Ac-
tress reappearance) and Trial type (A+O vs. AO+) as
within-subjects factors, and revealed a signiﬁcant interac-
tion between these two factors [F(1,12) = 7.01, p = .02,
g2p = .37]. Follow-up paired-samples t-tests were carried
out on each condition separately. For the A+O condition,
there was a signiﬁcant decrease in alpha amplitude from
baseline to the point of agent reappearance [t(12) = 2.31,
p = .04], indicating motor cortex activation when the
agent, who had a false belief that the ball was in the box,
returned to the scene. On the other hand, there was a3 Reaches at this age were often embedded in ongoing movement and
could often not be well isolated from a pre-movement baseline required for
identifying the frequency band that is reactive during movement.
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in the AO+ condition, where the agent had a false belief
that the ball was not in the box [t(12) = 1.51, p = .16]
(Fig. 3). The presence of motor activation when the agent
had a false belief about the ball’s presence, but not when
she had a false belief about the ball’s absence, suggests that
infants made a different prediction about what she would
do in each case. Speciﬁcally, the presence of motor activa-
tion, which has previously been demonstrated when an
observer expects someone else to act (Caetano et al.,
2007; Kilner et al., 2004; Southgate & Begus, 2013), in
the A+O condition, suggests that infants expected the
agent to reach for the box and based their action prediction
on what the agent, rather than the infant, believed to be
the case. Furthermore, to ensure that our left sensorimotor
effect in the A+O condition reﬂects changes in the senso-
rimotor alpha rhythm, and not the more posterior occipital
alpha rhythm, we analyzed changes in a cluster of occipital
channels where previous studies have shown the visual al-
pha rhythm to be dominant (Stroganova, Orekhova, & Pos-
ikera, 1999). A repeated measures ANOVA with Time and
Condition revealed no signiﬁcant main effects nor interac-
tions [p’s > .5], conﬁrming that our effect is a central, mo-
tor, phenomenon. Finally, a non-parametric test
conﬁrmed that our results are representative of the group.
10 out of 13 infants exhibited a decrease in alpha ampli-
tude from baseline (indicating motor activation) to agent
reappearance on A+O trials, whereas only 4 out of 13 in-
fants exhibited such a decrease on AO+ trials. A Fisher’s
exact test conﬁrmed that this difference is signiﬁcant
(p = .047, two-tailed).Fig. 3. Infant results. Left-hand column: Time–frequency (TF) plots for the 2 type
four left sensorimotor channels, and over all infants. Zero is the onset of the actre
was compared to the baseline period. Black rectangles indicate the time and fre
Topographic maps showing averaged amplitude over this 500 ms analysis per
sensorimotor channels over which data were averaged for statistical analysis.As our paradigm was an EEG paradigm, infants were
presented with multiple presentations of the two test vid-
eos. Infants contributed a median total of 8 A+O trials
(range = 6–12) and 7 AO+ trials (range = 6–12). It is pos-
sible that infants therefore learned during the experiment
which outcome – reach or no reach – went with which vi-
deo sequence, and our results reﬂect a learned association.
To address this question, we separately analyzed valid tri-
als that infants contributed from the ﬁrst half of the exper-
iment (i.e. artefact and movement-free trials occurring
during the ﬁrst 50% of the total trials the infant viewed,
median 3 A+O (range = 2–5) trials and 4 AO+(range =
3–5 trials)) and valid trials from the second half of the
experiment (median 4 A+O (range = 3–5) trials and 3
AO+(range = 2–5) trials). A repeated measures ANOVA
with Time and Condition revealed a signiﬁcant interaction
between Time and Condition for valid trials presented in
the ﬁrst half of the experiment [F(1,12) = 7.73, p = .017,
g2p = .39] and follow-up paired samples t-tests conﬁrmed
that there was a signiﬁcant decrease in alpha amplitude
from baseline to agent reappearance over left sensorimotor
cortex in the A+O condition [t(12) = 2.60, p = .023], but
only a non-signiﬁcant increase in alpha amplitude from
baseline to agent reappearance in the AO+ condition
[t(12) = 1.93, p = .08]. However, while the pattern of results
in the second half of the experiment was similar, the
decrease in sensorimotor alpha from baseline to agent
reappearance in the A+O condition did not reach signiﬁ-
cance [t(12) = 1.52, p = .16] and again there was no de-
crease in activity in the AO+ condition (p > .9). The fact
that motor activation in response to the reappearance ofs of test trial. TF plots reﬂect baseline corrected activity averaged over the
ss reappearance and activity averaged over the ﬁrst 500 ms of this period
quency range over which statistics were computed. Right-hand column:
iod and over the 5–7 Hz frequency band. Black dots indicate the 4 left
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(A+O) is strongest in the ﬁrst few trials strongly suggests
that it is not a result of a learned association formed during
the course of the experiment. Furthermore, while it is pos-
sible that associations could already be formed after only a
couple of exposures, the presence of our familiarization tri-
als provide further evidence against an association-based
interpretation of our results. The four familiarization trials
provided infants with evidence that, when the ball jumps
into the box, the agent subsequently reaches for the box
(x2), but when the ball jumps out of the box, the agent
does not reach for the box (x2). Thus, if infants were indeed
basing their expectations on learned associations, we
should expect that their performance on those ﬁrst few
test trials would show the opposite pattern i.e. they would
wrongly predict an action following the ball jumping into
the box, but not when the ball has jumped out of the
box. However, what we actually ﬁnd on those ﬁrst few test
trials following familiarization is the opposite: an expecta-
tion of action following the ball jumping out of the box,
and an expectation of no action following the ball jumping
into the box.4. Discussion
Recent work has demonstrated that young infants have
an early developing propensity to track events from others’
perspectives. In the current study, we go beyond these
ﬁndings by showing that, not only do young infants track
events from others’ perspectives, but also use these
representations to generate on-line action predictions.
Exploiting the documented correlation between motor
activation and action prediction (Caetano et al., 2007;
Kilner et al., 2004; Southgate and Begus,2013; Southgate
et al., 2009, 2010), we show that 6-month-old infants
(and adults) make an action prediction only when it is con-
gruent with an agent’s representation of the world.
The ability to generate predictions about others’ actions
is crucial to successful social interactions throughout life
(Blakemore & Decety, 2001; Verfaillie & Daems, 2002).
For humans especially, action prediction likely plays an
important role in facilitating cooperation and collaboration
(Sebanz & Knoblich, 2009). Studies suggest that, by around
12 months of age, human infants are already motivated to
help others attain their goals and to engage in collaborative
activities with others (Knudsen & Liszkowski, 2011;
Warneken & Tomasello, 2006) and an early emerging abil-
ity to predict what people will do by considering their
goals and beliefs may ensure that infants are ready to take
part in, and beneﬁt from, the uniquely collaborative struc-
ture of human culture. Indeed, recent research suggests
that even at 2 months, infants are already anticipating
the actions of others directed towards them (Reddy,
Markova, & Wallot, 2013), possibly to facilitate the smooth
coordination of the action and demonstrating active partic-
ipation in joint action shortly after birth.
While previous studies have used looking-time to ex-
pose young infants’ sensitivity to others’ beliefs, it was
not clear whether infant’s looking-time responses reﬂected
a prediction concerning how an agent’s representation ofevents would inﬂuence her behavior. There have been a
number of recent attempts to deconstruct what it is that
infants are doing when they exhibit sensitivity to others’
beliefs and various authors have pointed out ways in
which infant’s sensitivity to others’ beliefs could fall short
of a true understanding of belief (Apperly & Butterﬁll,
2011; Rakoczy, 2012). While there are many proposed
requirements for a genuine understanding of belief (see
Rakoczy, 2012 for a discussion of some of those), one of
these requirements is that one can integrate the attributed
belief with other mental states (e.g. goals) and understand
the functional implications of beliefs for action (Dennett,
1989). To date, we know little about infant’s appreciation
of the implications of beliefs for action. For example, in
the study by Kovacs et al. (2010), infants longer looking to-
wards an outcome that should be surprising to the agent
(but not to the infant) demonstrates that infants have en-
coded and created a representation of the event from the
agent’s perspective, and that this representation interferes
with the representation that the infant should have of the
event from their own perspective. However, it does not tell
us whether infants understand anything about the func-
tional consequences of holding a speciﬁc representation.
In the current study, however, the fact that infants gener-
ate action predictions which are accurate based on consid-
eration of the agent’s representation of an event, suggests
that they appreciated something of their functional conse-
quences and thus that infants understanding of others’
mental states goes beyond a mere sensitivity to belief sit-
uations (Rakoczy, 2012).
However, while the ability to predict others’ object-di-
rected actions may build upon a likely preceding ability
to predict actions directed towards the infant (Reddy
et al., 2013), it is unclear how infants could come to under-
stand that others’ actions should be predicted based on
their beliefs. While several authors have advocated an in-
nate, modular mechanism for attributing mental states
(Carruthers, 2013; Leslie, Friedman, & German, 2004), it
is also possible that infants could learn that others’ actions
are predictable based on certain observable factors. The
early propensity to try to predict others’ actions demon-
strated by Reddy et al. (2013) may make infants highly
sensitive to the factors that modulate others’ actions, such
as the physical relationship between the agent and an ob-
ject (e.g. infants may begin to notice that people’s heads
and eyes tend to be directed towards objects that they
reach for). While data gathered at 6 months cannot decide
between innately-speciﬁed mechanisms exploiting mental
state concepts (e.g. she will search in the box because she
thinks/believes the ball to be there) or acquired contingen-
cies (e.g. she will search in the box because she saw the ob-
ject jump in), it is worth noting that what we demonstrate
in this paper and describe as ‘belief-based action predic-
tion’ does not necessarily imply that infants operate with
a concept of belief as it is traditionally characterized
(Rakoczy, 2012). In functional terms, infants are correctly
predicting actions based on the other’s belief state. They
expect the agent to reach for the ball because the agent
represents the ball as being in the box. In mental state lan-
guage, they expect the agent to reach for the ball because
she thinks or believes the ball to be in the box. However,
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does not necessarily imply that they need be aware that
what the other holds is a belief, or have any beliefs about
what a belief is (e.g. that it can be true of false). While
we have evidence that infants consider the perceptions of
the other in generating a prediction about what the other
will do, we do not knowwhether infants maintain this rep-
resentation as an alternative representation of reality
(Kovacs et al., 2010) or whether they realize that the pre-
diction that they generate is based on a representation of
the world that may or may not mirror reality (Onishi &
Baillargeon, 2005; Scott & Baillargeon, 2009). Accurate pre-
dictions can be generated by considering only the others’
perceptual experiences without thinking about whether
the resulting representation held by the other is a true
reﬂection of the world (Southgate, 2013). Thus one possi-
bility might be that infants attend to those factors that
are most consequential for others’ actions (e.g. the object
as it is represented by the other) but do not yet represent
these in any relationship with the true state of affairs. In
this sense, infants might represent the object as the other
represents it, but they may not yet represent this represen-
tation as a belief that could be false. While this would
be highly effective for predicting others’ actions, it
would have limited value as an explanatory mechanism
(Southgate, 2013). This distinction between being capable
of performing the computations necessary for generating
action predictions that are consistent with the others’ be-
lief and being aware that what the other holds is a belief,
maps onto the distinction between personal and sub-per-
sonal level descriptions made by Dennett. Speciﬁcally,
while the data suggest that infants represent an event from
the others’ perspective (a sub-personal level claim), it is
not clear that they understand that what results from the
others’ perspective is a particular mental state with partic-
ular properties (Rakoczy, 2012).
Finally, although we use motor activation as a measure
of infants’ ability to make belief-based action predictions,
this does not imply that the motor system plays a role in
inferring these beliefs (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). Others
have made convincing arguments as to why the motor
(or mirror) system is not a good candidate for mental state
attributions (Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005), but our data also
suggest that the motor system is unlikely to be involved
in the process of attributing mental states. Mental state
attributions are required to generate an accurate predic-
tion in both the A+O condition and the AO+ condition.
Thus, if motor representations are involved in generating
inferences about the mental states that cause behavior
(Gallese & Goldman, 1998), they should be recruited in
both conditions. The fact that sensorimotor cortex is only
recruited when the agent’s false belief should cause her
to reach suggests that the involvement of the motor sys-
tem is one of predicting how the expected action will un-
fold (Csibra, 2007; Jacob, 2009; Southgate et al., 2010).
While previous research has demonstrated that suscep-
tibility to others’ mental states may interfere with infants’
own representations of events (Kovacs et al., 2010), our
data suggest that sensitivity to others’ mental states also
allows infants to predict what others will do next. This
ability to integrate ‘beliefs’ with expected actions goes be-yond what has previously been demonstrated, and sug-
gests that young infants understanding of other minds
goes beyond a mere sensitivity. Whether or not infants ac-
tion predictions are mediated by a genuine concept of be-
lief, or whether they are the product of representing the
world from the others’ perspective, our data demonstrate
that 6-month-old infants are skilled in attending to those
factors that are consequential for others’ actions.Acknowledgements
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